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Abstract
We develop a model to evaluate the impact of college education nance on welfare,
inequality and aggregate outcomes. Our model captures the stylized fact that entrepre-
neurs with college are more common and more protable. Our calibration to US data
suggests this is mainly because higher labor earnings allow college educated agents to
ameliorate credit constraints when they become entrepreneurs. The welfare benets
of subsidizing education are greater than those of eliminating nancing constraints on
education because subsidies ameliorate the impact of nancing constraints on would-be
entrepreneurs.
1 Introduction
Education and entrepreneurship are important determinants of the wealth of nations. Ed-
ucation represents the accumulation of human capital, whereas entrepreneurship is key for
accounting for patterns of nancial capital accumulation for example, in the United States
entrepreneurs account for a disproportionate share of the wealthiest households. In addition,
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the accumulation of capital through both education and entrepreneurship are thought to be
limited by borrowing constraints. This is one reason why, around the world, higher education
is often at least partially subsidized.1
Empirical work shows that entrepreneurs in developed economies disproportionately come
from among the college-educated, who also appear to make more protable entrepreneurs.2
This suggests that the incentives to go to college and to become entrepreneurs are inter-
twined. If so, nancing constraints on either of these two activities may a¤ect both human
and nancial capital accumulation. However, prior work has not studied the extent of these
interactions.3 There has also been no work trying to explain why entrepreneurs are more
likely to be college educated. Is it because the college educated are more likely to make
better entrepreneurs, or is it because they are wealthier? Also, what are the welfare im-
plications of public nancing of higher education in an environment where education and
entrepreneurship might interact?
This paper studies the impact of education nance when both college education and
entrepreneurship experience borrowing constraints. We develop a general equilibrium model
featuring both, and argue that the true impact of either form of nancing constraint on
aggregate outcomes cannot be assessed in isolation: the interactions among them are key
to understanding the impact of nancing constraints on aggregate outcomes, as well as
the role of entrepreneurship and education in the determination of aggregate outcomes.
That is, nancing constraints on entrepreneurship a¤ect the decision to become educated
specically, the decision to attend college and nancing constraints on education a¤ect
entrepreneurship rates, as well as aggregate outcomes. This paper is the rst to study the
joint impact of college education and entrepreneurship in a general equilibrium framework
with nancing constraints.
To understand these interrelations, consider the following see Figure 1. Borrowing limits
1Regarding the disproportionate share of entrepreneurs among the wealthy see Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997)
and Cagetti and de Nardi (2006). On borrowing constraints, see Becker (1975) or Cowan (2016) regarding
education and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) regarding entrepreneurship. Regarding the inalienability of human
capital see Hart and Moore (1994). See for example Myers and Rajan (1998) regarding the di¢ culty of using
physical or nancial capital as collateral.
2See Bates (1990), Parker and van Praag (2006) and Mondragon-Velez (2009).
3The related literature either does not have entrepreneurs or does not have college education, see for
example Cagetti and de Nardi (2006) and Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011). Terajima (2006) develops a
general equilibrium model with both entrepreneurs and college, but there are no nancing constraints.
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on entrepreneurs have been shown to account for the otherwise puzzling fat right tail in the
US wealth distribution, since the di¢ culty of raising external funds gives entrepreneurs
a powerful incentive to accumulate wealth  see Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).4 At the
same time, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and Buera (2009) nd that wealth is not a signicant
determinant of whether or not most agents become entrepreneurs. Thus, one might conclude
that nancing constraints are not key determinants of entrepreneurship rates, a central issue
in the economics of entrepreneurship. However, Bates (1990), Parker and van Praag (2006)
and Mondragon-Velez (2009) and others nd that a disproportionate share of entrepreneurs
is college-educated. If agents are barred from attending college by the inability to borrow,
then nancing constraints may signicantly lower the number of entrepreneurs even if no
agents report being unable to take advantage of an entrepreneurial opportunity because of
nancing constraints. Similarly, reductions in the protability of entrepreneurship due to
borrowing constraints may disproportionately lower the return to college, so that nancing
constraints lead some agents to nd it optimal not to go to college even when no agent reports
that borrowing constraints limit them from going to college. Such interrelations may imply
that studies of entrepreneurship that ignore education (and vice versa) fail to identify key
channels through which borrowing constraints a¤ect labor market and aggregate outcomes.
This also implies that the impact of public nancing of college may be di¢ cult to evaluate
without considering its impact on entrepreneurial activity. Finally, are the college-educated
more likely to become entrepreneurs because they make better entrepreneurs, or because the
college educated have higher wealth and are therefore less constrained? This matters for the
answers to all the other questions. If college educated entrepreneurs are intrinsically more
productive, then subsidizing education would not just increase the stock of human capital
but would also raise productivity. Even if not, any benets from subsidizing education would
depend on whether they signicantly relax nancing constraints on would-be entrepreneurs.
4Holtz-Eakin et al (1994), and more recently Blanchower (2009), provide evidence that borrowing con-
straints indeed limit entrepreneursscale of operation.
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Figure 1 The Golden Triangle: interrelations between credit
constraints on education and on entrepreneurship.
We develop a general equilibrium model to analyze the role of borrowing constraints in
agentshuman capital investment decisions and occupational choices. Borrowing constraints
arise because of a limited enforcement constraint: agents may default on their loans, in which
case they are subject to punishment. While no default occurs on the equilibrium path, the
extent to which agents can borrow is endogenously limited by the possibility of default.5 We
then calibrate the model to match data on the wealth distribution, occupational choice and
college attendance in the US. The calibration process matches model statistics to those of
US data, pinning down the key parameters of the model that govern the returns to di¤erent
activities and thus the educational and occupational choice decisions.
In the calibrated model, we nd that college-educated entrepreneurs are as productive as
the uneducated. In addition, they are equally likely to have entrepreneurial opportunities.
We nd that this is consistent with responses from the 2005 Factors of Business Success
5See Quadrini (2000), Cagetti and de Nardi (2006, 2009) and Buera et al (2011) for models with similar
constraints.
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survey conducted by the European Commission, where college educated entrepreneurs are
found to rely less on external nance while reporting that expanding the business is a pri-
ority as often as the uneducated, indicating no obvious di¤erence in the optimal scale of
operations.6
This nding has important consequences for our questions regarding the impact and
interrelationships between di¤erent types of nancing constraint. To answer the questions
posed earlier, we nd that:
 nancing constraints on education have a large impact on the composition of entre-
preneurship. Disallowing agents from borrowing for college lowers the share of college
educated agents from 29 to 12 percent, and the share of educated entrepreneurs drops
from 41 to 18 percent, although entrepreneurs with college are disproportionately prof-
itable (as college nancing constraints make college more of a privilege of the wealthy).
It also lowers entrepreneurship rates modestly from 7:55 to 7:20 percent.
 tightening nancing constraints on entrepreneurship lowers the number of entrepre-
neurs from 7:55 to about 4 percent. This lowers the di¤erences in the protability
of entrepreneurship across educational groups, since the relative lack of entrepreneurs
implies that the wealth distribution is atter.
 both kinds of constraints have signicant aggregate impact. For example, disallowing
agents from borrowing for college lowers GDP by 14 percent in the steady state equi-
librium. Disallowing agents from borrowing for entrepreneurship lowers GDP by 36
percent.7
Our policy experiments indicate other important interactions between credit constraints
on education and entrepreneurship. For example, we nd that subsidizing education can
increase income and welfare by more than double the impact of removing credit constraints
6While we cannot propose a formal inference criterion for our parameters, small changes in the values of
the parameters governing entrepreneurial opportunities and productivity cause large changes in the matched
statistics (such as the relative income and prevalence of enterprises run by people with or without collage),
indicating that the nding is robust. On the use of calibration as an econometric tool see Kydland and
Prescott (1996) and Cooley (1997) inter alia.
7These may seem like large numbers, but they are generated by matching the wealth distribution of the
US, which is fat-tailed in part due to the presence of some highly wealthy entrepreneurs. Notably the model
matches this feature of the data even though it is not a calibration target.
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on education. This is because the subsidies allow households not to deplete their wealth
on a college education, so young college-educated agents may start their rms earlier or at
a larger scale. Above a 70 percent subsidy rate, the policy becomes mainly redistributive
(rather than relaxing any nancing constraints) and above that rate income and welfare
deteriorate. Education grants only for agents who cannot a¤ord college by themselves have
a uniformly increasing impact on income and welfare, although they are less powerful than
subsidies. Subsidizing entrepreneurs has a large impact on income but the impact on welfare
is an order of magnitude lower because the benets accrue to a small set of agents who
are already disproportionately wealthy (entrepreneurs), whereas the benets of education
support are more equitably distributed. Subsidizing entrepreneurs changes the occupational
choice of the marginal entrepreneur, an agent who has barely enough wealth to become an
entrepreneur if an opportunity arises. Thus, a subsidy to entrepreneurs (in the form of a
subsidy or tax credit on interest) is e¤ectively a transfer to the wealthy. Finally, it turns out
that in terms of income and welfare, the US college nancing scheme is equivalent in terms
of GDP and welfare (relative to a world with no support at all) to a pure college subsidy rate
of around 30 percent of cost, or a need-based grant rate of about 50 percent. This provides,
for the rst time we believe, a sense of where the intensity of support for college in the US
lies in the spectrum of possibilities.
We underline that the purpose of this paper is to study entrepreneurship in a developed
economy context. Specically, the model is calibrated to match statistics for the United
States. A di¤erent approach to calibration would be appropriate to a developing country
context, where self employment rates are extremely high (Gollin 2002) specically, we could
introduce more values of entrepreneurial productivity. However that would signicantly
increase the computational cost. Also, as pointed out in Poschke (2013), self employment in
those environments is generally di¤erent from our notion of entrepreneurship in the sense that
many agents are self-employed out of necessity, especially in developing countries. The
notion of entrepreneurship in this paper is that of an agent who has a highly-productive,
capital-intensive idea, the implementation of which may be limited by nancing constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background to the exercise,
motivating the model in Section 3 using a combination of background literature and a recent,
large survey of entrepreneurs. Section 4 explains the calibration process and Section 5 reports
the results of our quantitative experiments.
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2 Motivation
We now provide a brief survey of the related literature that motivates our study. In addi-
tion, we provide a snapshot of entrepreneurship based on a large survey of entrepreneurs
across Europe, which provides further insight into the impact of nancing constraints on
entrepreneurship and education.
2.1 Background Literature
The determinants of entrepreneurship have been subject to extensive research. In particular,
it is well known that entrepreneurs tend to be wealthy, see Evans and Leighton (1989).
According to Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), under 8 percent of the workforce is made up of
entrepreneurs dened as business owners who manage their rms8 yet 54 percent of the
households in the top percentile of the wealth distribution are entrepreneurs.
An extensive literature nds that entrepreneurs tend to be wealthy, including Evans and
Jovanovic (1989), Blanchower and Oswald (1998), Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and Cagetti
and De Nardi (2006, 2009). Independently, the empirical literature regularly nds that
educational is linked to entrepreneurship however, this link has received much less attention.
Mondragon-Velez (2009) documents that among entrepreneurs, 41% have college education
or higher, while only 29% among the general population have attended college. Bates (1990)
nds that the probability of rm survival is higher if the entrepreneur has completed college.
Terajima (2006) nds that the earnings of college educated entrepreneurs between 1983 and
2001 was 2:35 times higher than the earnings of non-college educated entrepreneurs.
This raises two questions. First, are educated entrepreneurs more successful than the
uneducated because education increases their productivity, or simply because they are more
wealthy? Since the labor market rewards education, educated entrepreneurs might be more
successful simply because they accumulate wealth more rapidly, not because they are better
entrepreneurs. Notably, Diaz-Jimenez et al (1997) nd that the college-educated are 2:6
times as wealthy as the high-school educated.
8This is our denition too. In our model, it is key that the human capital of the owner be a central
determinant of the prots of the rm: thus, for example, someone who manages a business but does not own
it, or who owns a business but outsources its management, is not an entrepreneur in terms of our model.
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Second, it is well known that for some the ability to attend college is limited by wealth 
see Becker (1975), as well as more recent work such as Belley and Lochner (2007) and Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo (2011). Human capital acquired through education is inalienable: as a
result, default on an educational loan tends to trigger a harsh punishment regime, including
temporary exclusion from capital markets and wage garnishment (Ionescu (2009, 2011)), but
the human capital itself cannot be retrieved.
If the educated are more likely to be entrepreneurs, but education can be limited by
nancing constraints, then nancing constraints could in fact limit the number of entrepre-
neurs in the economy because many agents do not attain the college education that would
have increased their likelihood of becoming entrepreneurs in the rst place. Conversely, it
could be that the college educated are more likely to be entrepreneurs simply because only
the wealthy can become college educated in the rst place something which will depend
on the extent of government aid to students with nancial need. Resolving these questions
is important for understanding the incentives to go to college, the determinants of entrepre-
neurship, and the implications of policy in support of education or entrepreneurship. Related
quantitative work such as Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) that studies the role of nance and
entrepreneurship in inequality is unable to address these questions, because those models do
not include an education decision. Terajima (2006) does include an education decision, but
educational choice in his model is not subject to nancing constraints.
2.2 A snapshot of entrepreneurship
In addition to the data provided in the literature, we draw upon the 2005 Factors of Business
Success survey conducted by the European Commission. Covering about 338; 000 entrepre-
neurs across Europe, this survey provides a unique opportunity to establish certain stylized
facts about the link between entrepreneurship, college education and nance. While we use
data to calibrate our model from the US, Europe has a broadly similar level of development
as the US. Moreover, while countries in Europe are very open to cross-border nancial ows,
they have very di¤erent regimes for nancial support for college education, which allows us
to further exploit cross-country variation in education nance regimes to learn more about
these links. We measure it using the World Bank 1998-2012 share of GDP of government
support per student in tertiary education.
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1. Entrepreneurship is a state, not a type. Across the EU, only about 16% of
new entrepreneurs surveyed mentioned managing another enterprise as their previous
activity (as opposed to being an employee, student, or unemployed). See Table 1.
This rises to 19% for people with some form of tertiary education  either because
entrepreneurial opportunities come along more often, or because they are better able
to take advantage of them. See Table 2. On the other hand 81% of entrepreneurs report
that their plan for the future is to continue with the enterprise: entrepreneurship is a
persistent state. Finally, 73% of respondents report the prospect of a higher income
as a primary reason for becoming an entrepreneur: agents pursue entrepreneurship if
and when it is protable.
2. Entrepreneurship is largely an individual activity. the vast majority of entre-
preneurs (82%) report that they are the sole manager. Thus, the human capital of the
entrepreneur will be a critical input into the success or failure of the business. Also
68% of respondents report that they have no other current gainful activity: entrepre-
neurship is a full time job. See Table 1.
3. Self-nance is critical for entrepreneurs. Fully 85% of entrepreneurs reported
self-nancing as a key source of funds for their enterprise 85% of the uneducated and
88% of the educated. Interestingly, bank loans are less important for more educated
entrepreneurs, suggesting that their ability to self-nance is more likely to be su¢ cient.
This is consistent with the educated being wealthier: indeed the di¢ culty of nancing
as an obstacle to entrepreneurship is decreasing in education also. See Tables 1 and 2.
4. Financing constraints are a common problem constraining entrepreneurs.
Many entrepreneurs, at least 41%, report some kind of nancing constraint as being
a serious impediment to their business activity, and more than half report that the
highest priority if prots increase is to invest in the business. In Table 1 only about
a quarter indicate that paying o¤ loans is the highest priority (and in Table 2 the
college-educated report this less often).
5. Scale is constrained in terms of capital, not employment. Only 24% of re-
spondents say that expanding employment is a priority if earnings increase. Also, only
15% report expansion of employment as the expected development of the business
activity.
6. The educated do not obviously operate projects with larger target size. As
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indicated in the literature, the college-educated are generally wealthier. If the educated
were disproportionately productive, we would expect educated entrepreneurs to report
either that they are more constrained by their personal wealth or more dependent on
external nance due to larger target size. The survey data do not have this property.
The college educated report that paying o¤ loans is a high priority less often than
the uneducated, indicating that they are better able to self-nance and again do not
obviously require disproportionate quantitites of external funds to realize their projects.
Also the rate at which entrepreneurs report that business expansion is their priority if
earnings increase does not vary by education. This is something our calibration will
explore later, but the data do not obviously indicate that the educated typically have
projects of average larger size.
7. Support for college nance is correlated with lesss nancing constraints on
entrepreneurs, and higher protability. Table 3 reports that in countries where
college is subsidized entrepreneurs report fewer di¢ culties raising funds from external
sources.9 They also clearly report higher protability. Interestingly these responses are
related to greater access to bank loans by all entrepreneurs, not just the educated. This
suggests that there is some spillover from subsidized college to all potential entepreneurs
in the economy, for example through the creation of a greater pool of wealth from which
any entrepreneur might draw. On the other hand, the overall share of GDP spent on
education is not signicantly related to these responses unlike the extent of support
for college. Most interestingly, nor is the market capitalization of domestic rms as
a share of GDP, nor the ratio of private credit to GDP, both standard indicators of
nancial development (see Rajan and Zingales (1998) for example).10 Thus, support
for college is not a proxy for local nancial development.
In what follows we develop a model of college and entrepreneurship that captures the
features underlined above, and we explore the impact of education policy in the model.
9Although we do not have many countries in the survey (14 or 15 depending on the question), we can
still extract suggestive evidence from cross-country variation in the survey responses.
10All these country variables are measured using data from the World Bank WDI database.
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Table 1: Selected responses to the 2005 Factors of Business Success survey. Values correspond
to the share of respondents who answered "yes".
Survey question % respondents
Start-up nancing - own funds or savings 0.85
Start-up nancing - bank loan without collateral 0.07
Start-up nancing - bank loan with collateral 0.11
Start-up di¢ culties - to get nancing 0.55
Previous occupation - employee 0.56
Other current gainful activity - no 0.68
Current management - alone 0.82
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of bank loans 0.41
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of risk capital 0.31
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of short term credit 0.36
Highest priority if earnings increase - invest in the activity of the enterprise 0.54
Highest priority if earnings increase - pay o¤ loans or credits 0.26
Highest priority if earnings increase - hire more employees 0.24
Expected development of the business activity - hire more employees 0.15
Start-up motivation - prospect of making more money 0.73
Strategic plans - continuing the enterprise 0.81
Expected development of business activity - increase of number of employees 0.15
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Table 2: Selected responses to the 2005 Factors of Business Success survey - college vs. non-
college respondents. Values correspond to the share of respondents who answered "yes".
Survey question No college College
Start-up nancing - own funds or savings 0.849 0.877
Start-up nancing - bank loan without collateral 0.072 0.053
Start-up nancing - bank loan with collateral 0.122 0.081
Start-up di¢ culties - to get nancing 0.576 0.460
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of bank loans 0.439 0.304
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of risk capital 0.333 0.240
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of short term credit 0.377 0.277
Highest priority if earnings increase - invest in the activity of the enterprise 0.537 0.546
Highest priority if earnings increase - pay o¤ loans or credits 0.285 0.180
Start-up motivation - prospect of making more money 0.738 0.685
Strategic plans - continuing the enterprise 0.817 0.805
3 Model Economy
We present a general equilibrium model where households choose whether to work or to
become entrepreneurs, based on their expected earnings in either activity. These earnings
are a function of idiosyncratic productivity shocks and of their capital (wealth). There is
incomplete insurance, in that the only way agents may insure against idiosyncratic shocks
is by holding capital, as in Aiyagari (1994). Entrepreneurs may use their capital to produce
themselves, rather than renting it to other agents. Entrepreneurs may also produce using
borrowed capital: however, the extent to which they are able to borrow capital is limited by
an imperfect enforcement problem. If entrepreneurs refuse to repay their loans, then only a
fraction f of their prots and remaining capital may be garnished.11 Thus, in equilibrium
agents may only borrow capital up to the point that they are indi¤erent between repaying
and reneging. This inability to obtain the rst-best level of capital from external sources
is what provides entrepreneurs with an incentive to amass wealth. The model builds on a
standard approach to modeling entrepreneurs under nancing constraints, extended to allow
11See Quadrini (2000), Cooley et al. (2004), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006, 2009) and Buera et al (2011)
for similar constraints.
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Table 3: Selected responses to the 2005 Factors of Business Success survey. Values correspond
to the cross-country correlation between the share of respondents who answered "yes" and
country level measures. Coll. sup. is government support for each college student as a share
of GDP. Ed. sup. is the share of GDP devoted to government support for education. CAP
is the market capitalization of publicly traded rms as a share of GDP. CRED is private
credit as a share of GDP. Source: Eurostat or WDI.
Sample College sample Full sample
Survey question Coll. sup. Coll. sup. Ed. sup. CAP CRED
Start-up nancing - bank loan without coll. 0.790*** 0.809*** 0.305 0.168 0.240
Start-up nancing - bank loan with coll. 0.560** 0.685** 0.305 0.614** 0.554**
Start-up di¢ culties - to get nancing -0.766*** -0.766*** -0.462 -0.437 -0.253
Judgement of protability - very good 0.906*** 0.899*** 0.287 0.375 0.333
Judgement of protability - good 0.679** 0.793*** 0.208 0.418 0.465
Judgement of protability - barely suf. -0.636** -0.676*** 0.135 -0.200 -0.258
Judgement of protability - poor -0.578** -0.692*** -0.493 -0.447 -0.395
Highest priority - invest in the enterprise -0.452 -0.384 0.433 -0.029 -0.345
Highest priority - pay o¤ loans or credits 0.102 0.255 -0.154 0.377 0.484
Expected development - increase prots -0.331 -0.233 0.531** -0.163 -0.448
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for college entrepreneurs in a way consistent with the above empirical observations.
When born, agents choose an education level e  0, at a cost. Agents may borrow
to become educated: however, like entrepreneurs, they may renege on repayment. Human
capital is inalienable, so there is no way to reduce the agents chosen value of e if they default.
Instead, they are excluded from credit markets for a period of time, during which a share
 of their wages may be garnished. This follows the treatment of defaulted college loans
documented in Ionescu (2008, 2009 and 2011). If for a given value of e the agent cannot
a¤ord education on her own but would default if she were to borrow, then that level of e
is ruled out of the agents choice set. As a result, agents have an incentive to accumulate
savings so that their o¤spring may be less limited in their educational choices.
An important element of the model will be state support of education. This is because we
calibrate the economy to data for the United States, where there is extensive state support
for college education.
3.1 Technology
There are two sectors in the economy: entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial. The non-
entrepreneurial sector represents large publicly traded rms.12 It operates the standard
constant-returns technology:
Yt = AK

t L
1 
t (1)
where Yt is output, Kt is capital, Lt is labor and A is a productivity term.
Entrepreneurial rms are run by a single entrepreneur who operates the technology:
Y et = xtk
v
t ; 0 <  < 1. (2)
Here Y et is output and kt is capital input. The variable xt is an idiosyncratic productivity
term, as in the model of Lucas (1978).13 As discussed later, the choice of kt may be limited
by a borrowing constraint.14
12See Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006, 2009) for similar models.
13The literature does sometimes nd that psychological factors a¤ect entrepreneurs, e.g. Lindquist, Sol
and Van Praag (2015): while it is beyond the scope of the paper to address these, we note that the model
can accommodate such things as being among the determinants of xt.
14We do not allow entrepreneurs to hire workers for several reasons. First, the survey data indicate that
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3.2 Households
There is a continuum of agents in discrete time. Each period a mass of agents called New-
bornsenters the model. Newborns start life with a wealth inheritance, choosing their level
of education e  0. The following period they become Young.The young face a constant
probability of remaining young, y, whereas with probability 1  y they become Old.in
turn, old agents face a probability o of remaining old, whereas with probability 1  o they
leave the model. When old agents exit the model, they are each replaced by a newborn, who
inherits the old agents assets. We normalize the population to equal one.
Regardless of age, agents maximize expected discounted utility. Their instantaneous
utility function is u(c) = c
1 
1  ,  > 1, and their discount factor is . Each period agents are
endowed with one unit of labor, which they supply inelastically if they are workers. Agents
who choose to be entrepreneurs use up their labor managing the rm.
At each point in time, agents have two state variables, xt and yt. The variable xt is
the agents entrepreneurial ability and yt is their labor market earnings ability, net of any
education premia. These two states follow independent Markov processes: yt~F y (ytjyt 1; e)
and xt~F x (xtjxt 1; e). Notice that the Markov process governing the evolution of xt may
depend on the educational level e. Mondragon-Velez (2009) report that the college-educated
form a disproportionate share of entrepreneurs, and Terajima (2006) reports that college
educated entrepreneurs are more protable. On the other hand, our survey data did not
obviously suggest that entrepreneurs are signicantly more productive if they also have
college. We wish to establish whether this is because the college-educated are more likely
to have higher values of xt, or because the college-educated tend to be wealthier and thus
less nancially-constrained. In addition, the process for yt may also depend on education,
capturing the well-known nding that more educated agents tend to have higher labor market
earnings.
There are incomplete markets: agents may self-insure against di¤erent forms of idiosyn-
cratic risk via holdings at of nancial assets, which are claims on physical capital. Capital
pays net interest rate r and depreciates at rate .
expansion of employment is neither a priority nor an expected outcome of the business.the rm is larger for
the educated, one would expect them to report expansion of the business as being a priority more often.
Second, this maintains the focus of our work on the accumulation of physical/nancial capital, which both
the literature and the survey data indicate is the main priority of entrepreneurs.
15
3.2.1 Young agents
Each period, young agents choose whether to be entrepreneurs or workers. Young entrepre-
neurs use the technology (2) to generate income, using their own capital or borrowing capital
from other agents. They also earn income from capital they lend to other agents. With their
income they purchase consumption ct, and assets at+1 for next period.
A young entrepreneur has the value function
V e (at; xt; yt; e) = max
ct;at+1;kt
fu (ct) + yEV (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e) (3)
+(1  y) EW (at+1; xt+1; e)g
s:t:
ct + at+1  xtkt + (1  ) kt   (1 + r) (kt   at)
kt  0; at  0
Borrowing constraint (4) , see below
where V is the young agents expected value in the future if they remain young, to be
explained below, and W is their expected value in the future if they become old, to be
discussed below. The expectation E is taken with respect to xt+1 and yt+1, the idiosyncratic
entrepreneurial and labor market productivity shocks respectively. Note that the distribution
of xt+1 and yt+1 depends on e: for example, the well-known presence of a college wage
premium would imply that the distribution for F x among the more educated rst-order
stochastically dominates the distribution of F x among the less-educated. Thus, although we
use the notation E to denote expectations for xt+1 and yt+1 with simple notation, the reader
should remember that the expectation is conditional on current values of xt and yt as well
as e.
Entrepreneurs are also subject to a borrowing constraint. If kt  at > 0 then the agent is
borrowing and must pay (1 + r) (kt   at) to other agents. If the agent refuses to make this
repayment, they are punished by the garnishment of a fraction f of their prots and their
holdings of undepreciated capital, f [xtkt + (1  )kt].
Along the equilibrium path agents will not default. However, the fact that they could
default introduces an incentive compatibility constraint that can limit the extent to which
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rms can borrow.15 This constraint compares the value of repaying V e (at; xt; yt; e) with the
value of default, including the possibility that agents might choose di¤erent values of at+1
o¤ the equilibrium path. However, Buera et al (2011) show that the incentive compatibility
constraint takes the simple form
xtk

t + (1  ) kt   (1 + r) (kt   at)  (1  f) [xtkt + (1  )kt] (4)
In other words, what matters is whether or not the prots from default are higher now.16
If the unconstrained optimal capital usage violates this constraint, then the agent will only
be able to use the level of capital kt such that equation (4) holds with equality, or such that
kt = at, whichever is larger.
If the young agent chooses to be a worker, her value is
V w (at; xt; yt; e) = max
ct;at+1
fu (ct) + yEV (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e) (5)
+(1  y) EW r (at+1; xt+1; e)g
s:t:
at+1  (1  )wyt + at (1 + r)  ct
where w is the wage and yt is her labor productivity shock and  is the tax rate, and
where the expectation is conditional on xt+1, yt+1 and e. If the worker ages she retires,
earning value W r to be described below.
Finally, the agent chooses her occupation optimally. As a result, her value function V is
15In some models e.g. Evans and Jovanovic (1989), the nancing constraint takes the form of a simple
factor of wealth. However, Parker and van Praag (2006) nd that the extent to which rms are nancially
constrained appears to depend not just on wealth but also on education, indicating that such a constraint
is not appropriate in this context. This suggests a model such as Cagetti and De Nardi (2006, 2009) or
Buera et al (2011) where nancing constraints are due to a limited enforcement problem, whereby agents
may default on their debts. In this case, agentsnancing constraints will depend endogenously on their
wealth but also on their level of education, since it a¤ects both the protability of entrepreneurship and the
foregone income if they default and are punished. A model like this is also less subject to the Lucas Critique.
16The value function V () is strictly increasing in at, and with higher income agents can attain both higher
consumption and higher savings at+1. Thus, the value of default is higher than that of repayment if and
only if the current prots from default exceed those from repayment.
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V (at; xt; yt; e) = max fV e (at; xt; yt; e) ; V w (at; xt; yt; e)g : (6)
3.2.2 Old agents
Most old agents simply retire. The value for a retiree is W r, where
W r (at) = max
ct;at+1
fu (ct) + oW r (at+1) + (1  o)EV new (at+1; xt+1; yt+1)g (7)
s:t:
at+1  at (1 + r)  ct + p
Here, p is a social security payment. Recall that with probability o the agent exits the model
and is replaced by a newborn. The function V new is the value function for the newborn.
Young entrepreneurs who become old may choose to continue running their rms, if they
prefer not to retire. In that case they may become old entrepreneurs, whose value W e is
given by:
W e (at; xt; e) = max fu (ct) + oEW (at+1; xt+1; e) (8)
+(1  o)EV new (at+1; xt+1; yt+1)g
s:t:
at+1  xtkvt + (1  ) kt   (1 + r) (kt   at)  ct
kt  0; at  0
Borrowing constraint (4) :
where o 2 (0; 1) is the probability of remaining old. As in Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006), the expected value of the newborns value function is taken with respect to the
invariant distribution of yt, and their value of xt follows the usual Markov process based on
the newborns parents value of xt 1 and e. This allows agents to potentially inherit their
parentsrms a feature we introduce into the model due to the well known tendency of
entrepreneurship to run in families, see Lindquist, Sol and Van Praag (2015). Finally,
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W (at; xt; e) = max fW e (at; xt; e) ;W r (at)g : (9)
3.2.3 The Newborn
Newborn agents observe their initial values of xt and yt, and decide on their educational
level. If they choose not to become educated, they are identical to young agents for whom
e = 0, choosing whether to be workers or entrepreneurs. If they choose e > 0, they may work
but they may not become entrepreneurs.17 In this case, they must also pay an education
cost  (e; ), where  (0; ) = 0, e (e; ) > 0 and  (e; ) > 0.  is a random variable that
a¤ects the cost of education for a given agent, drawn from a distribution F . We introduce
 because later, in our calibration, we will have few values of e, so allowing for some noise
in the cost of education will ensure that educational decisions are not too lumpy in our
simulations.18 Our model contains the typical assumption that agents decide on whether or
not to go to college based on their ability and the relative payo¤ from doing so, as in for
example Jones and Yang (2016). Our model di¤ers from the prior literature in that "ability"
is 2-dimensional, encompassing the initial values of both xt and yt. The initial value of yt is
drawn from the ergodic distribution of F y for the uneducated.
To attain level of education e, agents may receive governmental support s (e; ; a). The
function s depends on the level of education e, its cost draw  and the agents wealth a.
Allowing for support s () will be important because it a¤ects the education-wealth link.
The value of an uneducated newborn V noneduc (at; xt; yt) is:
17This is for simplicity. If we allow the newly-educated to be entrepreneurs then there will be two nancing
constraints facing certain entrepreneurs, one related to rm size and one related to education, and it would
be di¢ cult to specify what occurs if the agent defaults on one type of loan but not the other. Since the very
young are unlikely to be entrepreneurs (in the calibrated economy entrepreneurs are under 8 percent of the
population and current college students are about 1 percent), we simply assume the newborns may not be
entrepreneurs.
18For example, if we let e 2 f0; 1g where e = 1 represents going to college, then  can be thought as
representing the fact that the college application process is uncertain and that there is variation in the cost
across universities (due to di¤erent tuition costs, cost of living di¤erences, etc).
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V noneduc (at; xt; yt) = maxfV e (at; xt; yt; 0) ; V w (at; xt; yt; 0)g
= V (at; xt; yt; 0)
where V eand V w are the value functions for entrepreneurs and workers respectively, as dened
earlier.
For educated newborn agents, the value V educ (at; xt; yt; e; ) is:
V educ (at; xt; yt; e; ) = max
c;a0
fu (ct) + EV (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e)g
s:t:
at+1  (1  )wtyt + (at    (e; ) + s (e; ; at)) (1 + r)  ct
Notice that if  (e; )   s (e; ; at) > at for any given level of e and  then agents must
borrow  (e; )   s (e; ; at)   at. In addition, subsidized loans may constitute part of the
subsidy scheme s.19 In order to borrow, agents must satisfy an incentive compatibility
constraint, otherwise they would default. If an agent defaults on an education loan then
she enters a punishment regime where she earns value Deduc (at; xt; yt; e). While being
punished the agent is barred from capital markets and from entrepreneurship, and there is
a wage garnishment rate  (e), as well as a probability  (e) that the agent will be forgiven
so the punishment regime ends. Thus we have that
Deduc (at; xt; yt; e) = max
ct;at+1
(
u (ct) + y[(1   (e))EDeduc (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e)+
 (e)EV (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e)] + (1  y)W r (at+1)
)
s:t:
at+1  (1 + r) at + (1   (e)) (1  )wtyt   ct
If the agent is forgiven, from then on she can choose occupations and borrow as a normal
young agent. If the agent is still unforgiven when she becomes old, she retires.
19For example, suppose that s1 is a system of grants and subsidies, whereas s2 is a rate of loan subsi-
dization up to a threshold L (like subsidized Sta¤ord loans in the US). Then, s (e; ; at) = s1 (e; ; at) +
min (L;max f0;  (e; )  s1 (e; ; at)  atg)
s2 (e; ; at) r. If the interest rate is lowered by a proportion &, then we have that s2 (e; ; at) = &:
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Since at the moment of default the agent would have no assets (having spent them on
education), the incentive compatibility constraint is
V educ (at; xt; yt; e; )  Deduc (0; xt; yt; e) :
If for given values of e and  this constraint is not satised, then the agent cannot attain
level of education e.
Finally, dene V educ (at; xt; yt; 0; )  V noneduc (at; xt; yt). The value of a newborn is
then:20
V new (at; xt; yt) =
Z
max
e2
V educ (at; xt; yt; e; )gdF  ()
 =

e : V educ (at; xt; yt; e; )  Deduc (0; xt; yt; e)
	
There is no childhood in the model: as in the related literature, we focus on the part
of the lifecycle during which agents are economically active. We also collapse college into
one period. Having 4 periods would allow students to drop out of college before completion:
however, this is not central to our topic of interest as the entrepreneurial returns to college
jump up for agents who completed college, see Mondragon-Velez (2009).
3.3 Equilibrium
Let !t be the aggregate state variable, the measure over di¤erent types of agents. The
measure !t is dened over the quintuple (a; x; y; e; g): the agents asset holdings, a, entre-
preneurial productivity x, labor market productivity y, education level e, and a variable
g 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g which indicates the agents life cycle stage: agents are classied as newborn,
young, old entrepreneurs or retirees. The measure !t 2 X is an element of the set X; where
X = R4+f1; 2; 3; 4g. There is a transition mapping   : X ! X, so that !t+1 =   (!t). The
mapping   is a function of agents optimal decision rules regarding savings, education and
occupational choice, as well as the stochastic processes for x, y,  and ageing.
20Notice that since  (0; ) = 0,  6= ?, so as long as there are nite values of e or the choice of e is compact
the problem of educational choice will have a solution.
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Denition 1 A stationary equilibrium is a wage w, an interest rate r, a tax rate  and a
measure ! such that:
 Young agents consumption, investment, capital use and occupational choices are opti-
mal, solving problems (3), (5) and (6), subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
on entrepreneurs.
 Old agents consumption, investment, capital use and occupational choices are opti-
mal, solving problems (7) and (8), subject to the incentive compatibility constraint on
entrepreneurs.
 Labor markets clear: total labor supply from workers equals the labor demand from the
nonentrepreneurial sector.
 Capital markets clear: total capital supply from all agents savings equals capital de-
mand from both entrepreneurial and nonentrepreneurial sectors.
 The government budget is in balance: total tax receipts equal total social security trans-
fers to retirees as well as total education support to newborns.
 The distribution of agents is invariant: ! =   (!).
4 Calibration
We need to calibrate the parameters , , , , y, o, , p, v, f , ,  as well as the functions
s, , F y and F x. We choose one year as our period length.
We try to x as many parameters as possible and calibrate the remaining parameters to
match various statistics regarding education, entrepreneurship and inequality in the US. The
depreciation rate of capital  is 6% as in Stokey and Rebelo (1995). The coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion  is 1:5; from Attanasio et al. (1999). Productivity in the non-entrepreneurial
sector is normalized to 1. The share of capital in the aggregate production function  is 0:33,
as in Gollin (2002). The probabilities of being young and old are chosen to yield an average
working life of 45 years and an average retirement period of 11 years. The discount factor 
is calibrated to match capital to output ratio of 3:3 as in Cooley and Prescott (1995). See
Tables 4 and 5.
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We use a parsimonious specication for entrepreneurship, setting x to equal either zero
or a positive value that depends on the level of education: x 2 f0;  (e) xhighg, xhigh > 0.
Parameter xhigh is the productivity of an uneducated entrepreneur, and  (e) is a premium
that an educated entrepreneur might have over that. Thus  (0) = 1.  (e) > 1 means that a
potential entrepreneur with education level e has more productive ideas than an uneducated
agent.  (e) < 1 means that the opposite is the case.
This way, as in much of the related literature, agents either do or do not have an entrepre-
neurial opportunity.21 Note, however, that it is not necessarily the case that all entrepreneurs
have the same target level of capital in equilibrium, since entrepreneurial productivity may
depend on education e. The calibration process will establish the empirically reasonable
values of the entrepreneurial education premium  () :
We set the set of education values e 2 f0; 1g, interpreting e = 1 as a college education. We
do this because Mondragon-Velez (2009) nds that the probability of being an entrepreneur
rises signicantly with college attendance, whereas Bates (1990) nds that the probability
of rm exit drops signicantly if the entrepreneur has a college degree. Thus it does not
seem useful to allow e to be dened more nely, while this would signicantly increase the
computational cost.
To select xhigh, we must establish the empirical counterpart of our notion of an entre-
preneur. In our model, the entrepreneur owns and manages her own business, such that her
human capital  in the form of her entrepreneurial productivity x and her education e 
is key to the protability of the enterprise. As a result, we consider an entrepreneur to be
someone who is both self employed and actively involved in the running of the enterprise.
The Survey of Consumer Finance contains an employee category of self employed and
also business owner with an active management role.As in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006),
we consider people who satisfy both criteria to constitute the empirical counterpart of an
entrepreneur in our model. We calibrate xhigh to match a share of entrepreneurs of 0:0755,
21Poschke (2013) observes that about 12 percent of the self-employed in the US do so "out of necessity."
We could introduce such agents into our model by having more values of x < xhigh. However this would
signicantly increase the computational cost. In addition, those agents would have small scale and any
nancing constraints on their operations would be of little consequence for aggregate savings behavior. Thus
we follow the approach of Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and focus on the high-ability entrepreneurs who
do not start enterprises "out of necessity." The Poschke (2013) denition of an entrepreneur is broader and
the number is larger do we do not view an adjustment to the Cagetti an De Nardi(2006) targets as being
necessary.
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as in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). The college premium for entrepreneurs  (1) is calibrated
to target average earnings of college educated entrepreneurs over the non-college educated,
as reported in Terajima (2006), which is 2:35. We use Terajima (2006) as it is the only
source, to our knowledge, which reports this and related statistics about college-educated
entrepreneurs over a prolonged time frame (1983-2001).
The transition matrix F x is a 2  2  2 tensor, since we allow the Markov process
governing the evolution of xt to depend on e. This requires in principle four parameters:
one each for the probability into and out of entrepreneurship for each level of e.22 Thus,"
1  in out
in 1  out
#

 [1; 0] for non-college educated, and
"
1  inin outout
inin 1  outout
#


[0; 1] for college educated.
We proceed as follows. First, Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) nd an exit rate among
entrepreneurs of 0:206 in PSID. Bates (1990) reports a logit regression that indicates how
the probability of survival varies when an agent earns a college degree. We choose the
probabilities of rm survival to match the mean from Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and the
di¤erences from Bates (1990) (see Appendix for details). This pins down values for out and
out, leaving us to calibrate in and in.
The parameter in is the probability that an uneducated worker with x = 0 has an
entrepreneurial draw of x = xhigh and the parameter in is the extent to which the educated
are more likely to have a draw of x = xhigh. in = 1 implies that the probability of a
draw of x = xhigh is equal for workers regardless of education. To match hazard rates into
entrepreneurship for college and non-college groups we match two statistics. One is the ow
rate of workers into entrepreneurship, which Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) report to be 2:3
percent. The other is the share of entrepreneurs with a college education, which is 41 percent
in Mondragon-Velez (2009).
We dene F y (y0jy; 0)  F y (y0jy) as the baseline distribution of shocks to labor income.
Then we set F y (  y0jy; 1) = F y (y0jy),   1. In words, there exists a college wage
premium  such that the distribution of labor income shocks for the college-educated rst-
order stochastically dominates that for the uneducated. This specication is useful because
22The probability of remaining an entrepreneur for each education group is one minus the probability of
going out of entrepreneurship, and the probability of remaining a worker is one minus the probability of
going into entrepreneurship. Thus, with these 4 parameters, the entire tensor is determined.
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Table 4: Parameters of The Model
A. Fixed Parameters
Parameter Value
 1:5 Attanasio et al. (1999)
 6% Stokey and Rebelo (1995)
 0:33 Gollin (2002)
A 1 Normalization
y 0:978 see text
o 0:911 see text
 1=7
 (1) 0:15
 1:4 Fang (2006)
B. Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Calibrated value
p 40% of GDP Kotliko¤, et al (1999)
v 0:926
x [0 0:448]
F x see text
 0:8706
F y see text
f 0:4083
(1; ) [3:29 3:47 3:65 3:84 4:02]
 (e) [1 1]
y [0:29 0:48 0:79 1:30 2:14]
s () see text
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Table 5: Parameters of The Model
Parameter Matched moments
p Transfer size as share of GDP
v Gini coe¢ cient of wealth
x % of entrepreneurs in the whole work force
Fx ow of workers into entrepreneurship (%), share of college educated entrepreneurs
 capital to GDP ratio
Fy Gini coe¢ cient of earnings
f median net worth of entrepreneurs vs whole population
(1; ) percentage of college educated population
 (e) average earnings of college vs. non-college educated entreps
s () share of agents in state college (see text)
the function  () can be calibrated to match the well-known college earnings premium. At
the same time, there will be signicant variation in labor market outcomes across agents with
the same value of e, due to the realizations of y. We set the college premium for workers 
to equal the estimate of 1:4 in Fang (2006). Fang (2006) considers that the observed college
premium combines the fact that worker productivity may rise as a result of earning a college
education, but that it could also be that college simply provides a signal to employers about
worker ability (Spence (1973)) or that higher ability agents might be more likely to attend
college. The estimate of 1:4 refers to the productivity increase from going to college, net
of any signalling and selection e¤ects, which is exactly our parameter . In our context,
this corresponds to the idea that newborns choose whether or not to go to college based
on their values of x and y, so the unconditional average college premium in the model may
also not accurately reect the productivity increase that comes from going to college. In
fact, given  = 1:4, we nd that the average wage of a college graduate in our model is 1:9
times higher than that of the average worker without college, underlining the importance of
the endogeneity of the college attendance decision. Over 1983-2001, Terajima (2006) reports
that in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) the ratio of average earnings of college
educated vs. non-college educated workers is precisely 1:9.
To match the earnings process F y (y0jy), we set log yt = log yt 1 + "t where the error is
normally distributed, and set the variance of "t to match the Gini of earnings to be 0:4 as in
the PSID data. We approximate it over a grid of ve values of y, so that log y = [ 1,  0:5,
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0, 0:5, 1].
We set the social security transfer p to match a ratio of social security transfers to
GDP of 40%, as in Kotliko¤ et al (1999). The degree of decreasing returns to scale in
the entrepreneurial production v is set to match a Gini coe¢ cient of wealth of 0:8. The
entrepreneurial punishment parameter f is calibrated to match the ratio of the median net
worth of entrepreneurs compared to the whole population, which Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006) report to equal 0:3.
Finally we discuss the structure of the education costs  (), the education nancing
scheme s (), and the punishment strategy for default on educational loans.
The education cost (e; ) is uniformly distributed over ve values. We set the mean cost
to match the share of educated agents in the population. This is 0:29 in the PSID according
to Mondragon-Velez (2009). The other values are set to cover uniformly the range plus or
minus 10% of the mean value. This provides some smoothing of the decision rules regarding
education.
The education nancing scheme s (e; ; at) is set to reproduce basic features of the United
States education nancing system. This is built on the following pillars:
1. The existence of state colleges, which are subsidized relative to private colleges
2. grants, such as Pell grants, up to a certain limit and contingent on household assets.
3. subsidized loans, also up to a certain limit and contingent on household assets.
First we capture the existence of state colleges by assuming that some agents receive a
subsidy that covers a certain proportion of the education cost  (1; ). This proportion is set
equal to 0:57. We arrive at this value by noting that the US Department of Education Fast
Facts 2013reports that the ratio of the cost of public vs private college is 0:43. We assume
furthermore that the purpose of state support s () is to reduce the link between wealth and
the ability to go to college. As such, we assume that only agents below a certain wealth
threshold are allowed to go to state colleges. We choose this threshold to match the share
of agents who go to state college and pay state tuition, which is 0:5.23 This threshold turns
23The Department of Education reports that 59 percent of college students attended public institutions,
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out to be about ve times GDP per capita. This is a reasonable value. Consider that in
the United States the mean age of rst birth for a woman is in the mid 20s, and for men is
slightly higher. This means that households who are sending their children to college tend
to be in their mid-40s at the earliest. The Census Bureau24 reports that in 2007 the median
wealth of households with a head of household in the age range 45-54 in this group was 3:5
times GDP, and the mean wealth was 12 times GDP.
Next, we calibrate grants. First, the need-based grant system in the United States implies
an expected contribution of at least 20% of assets each year.25. Over 4 years that accumulates
to 0:59 times the agents assets. There is also an upper bound on grants of $5645, which
turns out to be 17% of the cost of attending a private college in 2013 (US Department of
Education Fast Facts 2013). Thus, all agents (regardless of whether or not they attend a
public institution) are allowed a grant of up to the smallest of 17 percent of the mean value
of the college cost  (1; ) or 1  0:59 of their assets.
Last, we calibrate subsidized loans by assuming that interest on loans is subsidized so
that the interest rate is half the market rate. This is based on the treatment of subsidized vs.
unsubsidized Sta¤ord loans.26 This is up to a limit of about $5000 for 2013, which is about
15% of the annual private college cost. Similarly, in the model we assume that agents may
borrow up to 15% of the college cost, assuming this does not exceed their funding through
subsidies and/or grants. Thus, in all three forms, government support for education depends
on the cost of college and on the agents wealth.
We calibrate the punishment parameters for defaulting on educational loans as follows.
The probability of being forgiven in the education loan market  = 1=7 so that defaulters
are forgiven after 7 years of punishment on average. This is the period of time for which a
default notice remains on the credit report of someone who defaults on a student loan. The
wage garnishment rate for education loan defaulters,  = 0:15, which is the limit in the US
for default on a subsidized loan. We do not distinguish in the benchmark economy between
subsidized loans and unsubsidized loans as far as the garnishment rate is concerned.
whereas according to Wintergreen Orchard House (an educational database compiler) the median share of out
of state students at public universities is 14 percent, see http://www.collegexpress.com/lists/list/percentage-
of-out-of-state-students-at-public-universities/360/, last checked 8/28/14.
24See http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0720.xls, last checked 8/28/14.
25See the detailed formula for computing the Expected Family Contribution at
http://ifap.ed.gov/efcformulaguide/attachments/091913EFCFormulaGuide1415.pdf, last checked 8/28/14.
26See https://studentaid.ed.gov. Last checked 09/04/14.
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Table 6: Calibration Statistics
Target Baseline Model
Transfer size as share of GDP 0:4 0:4
capital to GDP ratio 3:3 3:3
Gini coe¢ cient of wealth 0:80 0:82
% of entrepreneurs in the whole work force 7:6 7:5
median net worth of entrepreneurs vs whole population 0:3 0:3
percentage of college educated population 0:29 0:29
share of college educated entrepreneurs 0:41 0:41
ow of workers into entrepreneurship (%) 2:3 2:3
Gini coe¢ cient of earnings 0:38 0:34
average earnings of college vs. non-college educated entreps 2:35 2:35
share of agents in state college 0:5 0:5
Finally, a comment on our denition of GDP in the model. We do not consider spending
on college as a component of GDP. The reason for this is that it is small (only 1 percent of
agents are newborn college attendees in any period), and because we do not want the impact
of policy on GDP to be simply due to the fact that spending on college is itself counted as
part of GDP.
5 Results
The calibration procedure matches broad statistics such as the Gini coe¢ cient of the wealth
distribution. However, the model also matches reasonably well other features of the wealth
distribution. For example, in the model, the wealthiest 20% of the population holds 83:6%
of the wealth. In the US data, according to Chang and Kim (2006), this statistic is about
80% in the SCF. Furthermore, in the model the wealthiest 1% of the population holds 40%
of the wealth. According to Wol¤ (2010), this gure has varied between 34% and 39% for
overall wealth between 1983 and 2007, and between 42% and 47% for non-home wealth. At
the other end of the wealth distribution, 10 percent of the agents in our model have zero
wealth: this is the range of 7 13% found in the SCF by Cagetti and de Nardi (2009). Thus,
our model does a good job replicating the shape of the wealth distribution, even though the
calibration process did not attempt to match anything but the Gini coe¢ cient.
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There are certain other results from the calibration that are worthy of mention. In
particular, we nd that college educated entrepreneurs are no more likely than the non-
college educated to earn an entrepreneurial opportunity: in = 1. Nor are college educated
entrepreneurs more productive:  (0) =  (1) = 1. This is consistent with the "snapshot of
entrepreneurship" in Section 2. This is an important nding because it implies that, while
the educated are more likely to be entrepreneurs, and even though they tend to be more
successful, this is not because entrepreneurial opportunities or productivity are di¤erent for
them except for the hazard rate out of entrepreneurship, which is about 0:22 for agents
without college and 0:19 for the college educated (quite close). Entrepreneurship is more
protable for the educated primarily because the educated are also wealthier.
Why might this be? Lazear (2005) nds that entrepreneurs tend to be generalists, who
have knowledge about many di¤erent aspects of management, rather than specialists. It
could be that higher education is more likely to create specialists, who may have brilliant
ideas but who may not necessarily have developed the ancillary skills to make it happen. For
example, Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) nd that leadership skills, something that could be
important for entrepreneurs, are developed in high school rather than in college, indicating
that the process that creates entrepreneurial skills and opportunities is likely independent
from whether or not agents have gone to college.
Given the importance of this nding, its robustness is important. In a calibration exercise
of this kind it is generally di¢ cult to perform statistical inference (e.g. formulating condence
intervals), since we are directly comparing the steady state of the model to moments from
the data. However, we checked for robustness in the following ways. First, we started o¤
our calibration with several di¤erent initial conditions: it eventually always converged to
these values. Second, we varied each of these parameters, individually, by 10 percent.
The parameters we varied were  (1) (the productivity of educated entrepreneurs relative to
uneducated entrepreneurs and in (the extent to which a worker is more likely to have an
entrepreneurial opportunity if she is educated). We then examined whether this signicantly
changed the match between model-generated statistics and the data.
For example, varying the productivity of educated entrepreneurs relative to the unedu-
cated  (1) by 10 percent changes the income of the educated entrepreneurs relative to the
uneducated over a range of 1:1 to 4:9, compared to the calibrated value of 2:3. These are
substantial changes in the statistic most directly a¤ected by this parameter. In addition,
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other statistics change signicantly. The share of college educated agents in the economy
varies from 0:23 to 0:41 (compared to a calibrated value of 0:29), and the share of educated
entrepreneurs varies from 0:29 to 0:60 (compared to a calibrated value of 0:41). Thus, we
view the result that  (1) t 1 as being robust. This result also shows the sensitivity of
educational decisions to entrepreneurial returns.
Varying the probability of an entrepreneurial opportunity for the educated worker rela-
tively to the uneducated in by 10 percent changes the share of educated entrepreneurs
from 0:34 to 0:45 (compared to a calibrated value of 0:41). The overall share of college
educated agents in the economy varies from 0:26 to 0:30 (compared to a calibrated value of
0:29), and the earnings of educated entrepreneurs relative to the uneducated vary from 2:0
to 2:7. Thus, we view the result that in t 1 as being robust too.27 This result also shows
the sensitivity of educational choice to entrepreneurial opportunity.
Finally, based on the related literature, in our calibration the probability of survival of an
entrepreneurial opportunity is set to be higher for an educated entrepreneur i.e. out 6= 1. It
is worth asking whether this result is robust too: in other words, if we impose that out = 1, so
that the entrepreneurial opportunity process is identical for all agents regardless of education,
does anything change? It turns out that, if we set out = 1 and preserve the average exit rate
among entrepreneurs, the statistics matched change negligibly. We conclude that assuming
out 6= 1, as indicated by the related empirical literature, is not critical for the calibration. In
other words, F x is not signicantly di¤erent for di¤erent levels of education in terms of the
outcomes it generates for the statistics we used to calibrate the model economy. Nonetheless
we maintain the assumption that out 6= 1 in what follows, as this is what the empirical
literature indicates.
Now we compare the wealth of agents with di¤erent occupations and education levels, see
Figure 2. In the upper-left panel, entrepreneurs are in generally wealthier than workers. The
upper-right graph shows the wealth distribution of college and non-college educated agents.
College educated agents are wealthier, while the population with zero assets are mainly the
non-college educated. When comparing the wealth levels between college educated entrepre-
neurs and workers (the lower-left graph in Figure 2), entrepreneurs are disproportionately
wealthy. All these ndings are consistent with the data. We further compare the wealth
27In an earlier draft we calibrated the model to match all the relevant statistics assuming that there was no
support for education, also nding that neither the production function for entrepreneurs nor the probability
of becoming an entrepreneur were signicantly di¤erent for agents with or without college education.
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of college educated and non-college educated entrepreneurs (the lower-right graph in Figure
2). College educated entrepreneurs are wealthier, because of their higher labor productivity
and also because creditors require a higher wealth threshold to lend to college educated en-
trepreneurs, since the value of working (related to the earnings from default) is higher for
them.28
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Figure 2 Wealth distribution by occupation and education.
5.1 Comparing constraints
In the model, college attendance is limited by a credit constraint. What is the impact of this
constraint on equilibrium behavior? It turns out that if the newborn has no entrepreneurial
opportunity (x = 0) then agents only go to college if they have wealth above a certain
28In a model of this kind, the probability of entrepreneurship is increasing in wealth. Empirically, Hurst
and Lusardi (2004) nd that the probability of entrepreneurship is fairly at over much of the wealth
distribution. As in Cagetti and de Nardi (2006), we nd that repeating the Hurst and Lusardi (2004)
estimation using samples of agents drawn from the model yields condence intervals that cover their estimated
wealth-entrepreneurship prole. Results are available upon request.
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level. This level is decreasing in y and increasing in the cost of college. See Figure 3.
Thus, interpreting y as agent ability, the model accounts for the nding in Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo (2011) and others that high-ability agents are more likely to go to college.
If the newborn does have an entrepreneurial opportunity (x > 0), the decision rule has a
di¤erent structure which underlines the interaction between education, entrepreneurship and
credit constraints. For low values of y, no agent goes to college: college is una¤ordable for
low-wealth agents, and entrepreneurship preferable for high-wealth agents. For high values
of y, things are more complicated. Again, if agents have low wealth they do not go to college
as they cannot a¤ord it nor do they become entrepreneurs, see Figures 3 and 4. Above a
certain level of wealth agents can a¤ord college and they do attend, and this is preferable to
entrepreneurship because of their low wealth, which would lead their rms to be unprotably
small. Finally there is another higher wealth threshold above which again agents to do not
go to college. In this case their wealth is su¢ cient for the returns from entrepreneurship
to outweigh the higher wages from going to college. Thus, even though the specication of
education and entrepreneurship in the model economy is very parsimonious, there will be a
few young high-ability agents who become entrepreneurs instead of completing college, some
Bill Gates.As before, high-y agents are more likely than low-y agents to go to college even
when x = xhigh.
33
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
La
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 y
Wealth in $1000
No entrepreneurial opportunity, x=0
Increasing college cost
COLLEGE
NO COLLEGE
0 50 100 150
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
La
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 y
Wealth in $1000
Increasing college cost
COLLEGE
NO COLLEGE
Entrepreneurial opportunity, x>0
Figure 3 Decision rule for going to college. Each line corresponds to
the income threshold y above which agents attend college in equilibrium, for a
given college cost  (1; ) .
What is the macroeconomic impact of constraints on education? We compared the
behavior of the benchmark economy with 2 other economies. In one, there is no punishment
for borrowing, so borrowers default for sure. Thus, credit constraints are at their tightest:
no borrowing will occur for college. In the other economy, the punishment for default is
innity, so any agent may borrow for college if the benets of college exceed those from not
becoming educated for their type. In both experiments the education support function s is
held constant.
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Figure 4 Decision rules for becoming an entrepreneur for agents with x > 0.
The increasing step function is the boundary between (a; y) combinations that
lead to di¤erent optimal occupational choices. The contours represent the
educational decision from the previous graph. Above a given contour line, agents
optimally go to college. Higher contour lines represent higher college costs  (1; ) .
We nd that, relative to the benchmark economy, when borrowing for college is not
allowed then GDP drops to 86% of the benchmark value. Thus, the ability to borrow for col-
lege has a signicant aggregate impact even though there is signicant public aid to college
students. The share of educated agents is 12%, down from 29%. The share of entrepreneurs
with college drops from 41% to 18%. Nonetheless, college educated entrepreneurs are now
2:9 times more protable than their uneducated counterparts. This is because college-goers
are now only those that can attend without borrowing, so any college educated entrepreneurs
will be disproportionately wealthy.
We nd that, when credit constraints on education are removed altogether (i.e. there is
innite punishment for reneging on college loans), the aggregate impact is also signicant.
GDP rises by 12%. The number of college educated agents rises to 44% and the share of
entrepreneurs with college rises to 58%. Thus the model suggests that tightening punishment
on college default also has signicant aggregate impact.
Interestingly, varying between no constraints on education borrowing and full constraints
on education borrowing, entrepreneurship rates vary from 7:20 percent to 7:64 percent, with
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the benchmark value in between at 7:50 percent. Thus, education borrowing constraints
do not have much impact on entrepreneurship rates. Their aggregate impact is through
the stock of human capital and the greater physical capital accumulated by more educated
agents, which can then be used by entrepreneurs to expand. Interest rates change negligibly
(by 0:5 percent across scenarios) so the key channel here is self-nancing.
In the introduction we asked whether constraints on the nancing of education could be
important for causing the fat tail: in the US wealth distribution. In the calibrated model,
the wealthiest 20% of the population holds 84% of the wealth. Furthermore, the wealthiest
1% of the population holds 40% of the wealth. 10 percent of the agents in our model have
zero wealth. When there is no borrowing for education (i.e. punishment for default is zero),
the wealthiest 20% of the population holds 82% of the wealth. The wealthiest 1% of the
population holds 40% of the wealth as before. 10 percent of the agents in our model have
zero wealth. On the other hand, when there are no constraints on borrowing for education
(i.e. punishment for default is innite), the wealthiest 20% of the population holds 83%
of the wealth. The wealthiest 1% of the population holds 40% of the wealth as before. 0
percent of the agents in our model have zero wealth. Thus, constraints on the nancing of
education are not in fact the principal cause of the fat tail in the income distribution, but
being able to borrow for education without constraints turns out to make a big di¤erence to
the poorest agents i.e., the left tail.
We also nd that the aggregate impact of constraints on entrepreneurs is even larger
than the impact of the education constraints. For example, recall that when we vary the
punishment for reneging on an education loan between zero and innity, GDP ranges from
86% to 112% of the benchmark value. This range of GDP values relative to the benchmark
is obtained by varying the value of the entrepreneurial punishment parameter f from 0:37
to 0:43 (recall that the benchmark value is f = 0:4083). We nd that, relative to the
benchmark economy, when borrowing for entrepreneurship is not allowed at all (f = 0,
no punishment) then GDP drops to 64% of the benchmark value. This is a large value,
and it is due to the fact that the ability to borrow in the calibrated economy is critical for
entrepreneurs with relatively low wealth to be able to achieve a reasonable scale of operation.
The number of entrepreneurs drops to 4:5% of the workforce. The share of educated agents
is 26%, down from 29%. The share of entrepreneurs with college rises from 41% to 42%.
Interestingly college educated entrepreneurs are now only 1:9 times more protable than
their uneducated counterparts. This is because the wealth distribution is atter, the Gini
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coe¢ cient of wealth drops to 0:71. The capital-output ratio drops to 2:9. Since capital is
hard to borrow it becomes expensive (the interest rate rises by 1:7 percent), limiting the
returns to entrepreneurship and hence also to college, relative to the calibrated economy.
Thus, credit constraints on entrepreneurs have a substantial impact on the incentive to go
to college.
5.2 Policy Experiments
We now conduct some policy experiments to evaluate the impact of the nancing of ed-
ucation on the aggregate economy. We perform several experiments, mainly by changing
the support function s (). First, we examine environments in which the cost of college is
subsidized. This allows us to assess the extent to which support for college education in
general a¤ects aggregate outcomes. Second, we examine environments in which the cost of
college is subsidized only for agents who cannot a¤ord it i.e. there are educational grants.
This allows us to assess the extent to which support for college education taking account of
wealth a¤ects aggregate outcomes. Finally, we compare educational subsidies to other policy
measures in our economic environment.
These results should be taken as benchmarks. Di¤erent ways of modeling the labor
market could a¤ect the quantitative conclusions. In general an increase in the supply of an
input (e.g. college-educated labor) might be expected to lower its relative price. However,
Acemoglu (2002) shows that an increase in skilled labor may under certain conditions lead
to an increase in its relative price in an environment with induced technical change. Thus
it is not a priori clear how a change in the supply of college-educated agents will a¤ect the
college wage premium. This is the sense in which our policy results are a benchmark: they
are agnostic as to the manner in which the supply of college labor might a¤ect the skill
premium. At the same time, the qualitative features of the policy analysis should be robust,
as should the orders of magnitude. For example, if variable v changes a lot in response to
policy, very strong o¤setting e¤ects would be required to overturn this result in an alternative
environment.
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5.3 Welfare
An important part of our analysis will be the impact of policy on welfare. In a representative
agent context, welfare is commonly measured using the per-period increase in consumption in
the steady state equilibrium that would make the agent indi¤erent between the environments
with and without policy the compensating variation. We require a welfare criterion that
is applicable to a heterogeneous agent environment. A type-by-type comparison of agent
welfare is not appropriate since the number of agents of each type is endogenous and since
agent identities are unrelated to their types. Thus we propose the following welfare criterion.
Dene environment O to be the steady state equilibrium of the benchmark economy, and
let environment P be the equilibrium of an economy with some policy. Now consider an
agent who is not in the model, but has preferences the same as the agents in the model.
This agent will be randomly dropped into environment O. The agent does not, however,
know what type (a; x; y; e; g) she will be. The probability that the agent has a given type
is determined by the equilibrium measure of agent types !. The welfare criterion is the
percentage of consumption that should be added to each agent in environment O such that
the agent would be indi¤erent between being dropped into environment O or environment
P . This criterion is based on the original positionconcept in Rawls (1971), but assumes
that agents maximize expected utility as argued in Harsanyi (1975), since all agents have
the same utility function in our environment. We name this an OP compensating variation.
Of course there are changes in the economic environment that benet many agents,
and other changes that benet few agents. A change that benets all agents by a certain
amount, and a di¤erent change that benets a few agents by a huge amount, may have a
similar OP compensating variation. As a result, from a welfare perspective, we are interested
in distinguishing between these two scenarios, since they have very di¤erent distributional
implications. In one case agents are generally better o¤, whereas in another they are better
o¤ on average because some of them have a small shot at a very high payo¤. We identify
these two scenarios by seeing whether a particular change in the environment generates
changes in both GDP and in welfare that are of the same order of magnitude. If they are,
we call it an equitablechange. If they are not, we call it an inequitablechange.
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5.4 The impact of US college nance
First, to evaluate the impact of the current US nancing scheme as calibrated, we remove
all support by setting s (e; ; a) = 0. We nd that welfare and output decrease signicantly
once educational subsidies are removed. Welfare by the OP criterion drops by 9 percent, and
GDP drops by 12 percent. The number of agents who attend college decreases sharply from
29 to 15 percent. Interestingly the number of entrepreneurs changes only from 7:5 percent to
7:2 percent, suggesting that the current level of education support in the US is not enough to
signicantly change the wealth of young would-be entrepreneurs who graduate from college.
This indicates that the current scheme providing nancial support for education is e¤ective
at resolving to some extent the limited enforcement problems in the market for education.
The ratio of the earnings of college educated to those of non-college educated entrepreneurs
rises from 2:35 to 2:73, yet the share of entrepreneurs with college drops from 0:41 to 0:22.
Thus, fewer agents can a¤ord college, and those that can are wealthy, so that when they
become entrepreneurs they are disproportionately able to generate income.
5.4.1 Subsidized education
A broad way to get a sense of how important government support for education can be is to
consider a simple subsidy towards the costs of college. This is useful because it tells us how
general support for the education sector matters for aggregate outcomes, and also because
comparing subsidy outcomes to the US regime gives us a sense of the equivalent subsidy
scheme, a sense of the intensity of actual support for the education sector.
The government nances the education cost for newborn agents at rate & 2 [0; 1]. Agents
face an education cost of  (1; )  (1   &), and for each college student the government
provides a subsidy of  (1; )  &, if the agent chooses to attend college given this nancing
arrangement. The subsidy is nanced from taxation in the same way as pension payments,
and the budget constraint must hold with equality each period.29
Figure 5 shows that GDP, the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth, the college share of population
and the share of entrepreneurs generally rise with the subsidy rate &. The subsidies increase
output because increased college attendance raises worker productivity and also increases
29Tax rates in our policy experiments vary little, ranging between 21 and 23 percent.
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the number of entrepreneurs, who are also less credit constrained. On the other hand the
subsidies also lead to greater wealth inequality because wealth is more concentrated among
the educated entrepreneurs. A 100% subsidy to education (& = 1) leads to a rise in welfare
of 38:3 percent a signicant amount. The Gini coe¢ cient of wealth increases indicating
that there is increasing inequality, because more college educated agents means more entre-
preneurs. Notably, however, a 100% subsidy is not the most e¢ cient level in terms of GDP
or welfare, because past a certain point taxation becomes burdensome. Above about 70%
(& = 0:7) the policy does little to encourage college attendance and entrepreneurship, so the
policy becomes mainly redistributive. Above this point, GDP is at and welfare actually
decreases as the subsidy rate rises.
It is notable that the wage hardly changes: even when & = 1 the e¢ ciency wage w is only 2
percent higher than when & = 0. The large impact on income and welfare is due to the much
larger stock of human capital, in the form of college-educated agents. With more college
educated agents, there are also more entrepreneurs, because agents are wealthier and thus
less likely to be constrained in their scale of operation. The level of entrepreneurship varies
between 0:073 and 0:082 depending on the subsidy rate, but the corresponding reduction in
the number of agents working is not enough to signicantly change the wage rate. Similarly,
the interest rate drops between these two scenarios only by 4 percent of its benchmark value.
The increase in capital generated by having more educated agents is o¤set by the increase
in the scale of entrepreneurial operations and thus the demand for capital.
Finally it is useful to know what intensity of subsidies is equivalent to the US nancing
scheme. A subsidy of 27% generates the same level of GDP as the US scheme in the calibrated
economy. A 28% subsidy generates the same level of welfare as the US scheme. Thus, the
US scheme lies about a third of the way in terms of the broad spectrum of possible nancial
support of college education.
Notice that the increase in welfare from subsidies can be larger than the increase in wel-
fare from eliminating credit constraints on education nance. The reason is that educational
nancing constraints are not the only market failures in this economy: constraints on entre-
preneurs exist also. Subsidies imply that students who go to college will have more wealth
when they graduate, leading them to be able to nance any entrepreneurial opportunities
that might come along at a more e¢ cient level as well as having more wealth they could
lend to other agents who might have entrepreneurial opportunities. This policy not only
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relaxes the college credit constraint but also the entrepreneurial credit constraint. This is
consistent with our survey results, where countries with greater support for college education
tend to have more protable entrepreneurs who are less likely to report nancing constraints
as a limitation.
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Figure 5 Subsidies to college and macroeconomic aggregates. Each panel plots
the extent to which the cost of college is subsidized against a statistic drawn from
the model economy.
5.4.2 Grants
Now we examine education cost grants for those agents who need to borrow to attend college.
Thus if an agent has assets a where a <  (1; ), then the government subsidizes the cost of
college above their assets at rate & 2 [0; 1], providing &  ( (1; )  a), if the agent is willing
and able to attend college. Again, these subsidies are nanced out of general taxation and
the government budget constraint must be satised each period.
Figure 6 indicates that wealth inequality and the college educated population rise with
the grant rate. We nd that a 100% grant for students who cannot a¤ord college raises
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welfare by 21:5 percent. Again, the policy generally raises wealth inequality because it
enables more entrepreneurship. This time, welfare gains do not deteriorate for high values
of &, as it is more targeted towards nancially constrained agents than a broad educational
subsidy. Notice that, while grants do not achieve the same maximum level of GDP and
welfare as subsidies because subsidies allow would-be entrepreneurs to have a larger pool
of capital the di¤erences are not large. A 100% grant rate raises GDP by 31% and welfare
by 22%. By contrast, a 90% subsidy rate raises GDP by 32% and an 80% subsidy rate raises
welfare by 25%.
Again, it is useful to know what intensity of subsidies is equivalent to the US nancing
scheme. A grant rate of 50% generates the same level of GDP as the US scheme in the
calibrated economy. A 52% grant rate generates the same level of welfare as the US scheme.
Thus, in the model economy, needbased grants can have a large impact on welfare and on
income, although not as large as subsidies. The US scheme is about half way in terms of the
possible scope of needbased support for education.
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Figure 6 Education grants for college and macroeconomic aggregates. Each panel plots
the extent to which the cost of college above the agents wealth is subsidized
against a statistic drawn from the model economy.
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5.5 Other policies
There are two types of nancing constraints in the model economy: on education and on
entrepreneurship. Our experiments changing the entrepreneurial punishment parameter f
suggest that the latter can have a larger impact on aggregates. This begs the question: what
would be the impact on capital accumulation and welfare of subsidizing entrepreneurs?
We answer this question by studying the impact of a subsidy on the interest paid by
entrepreneurs when they borrow capital. Instead of paying interest r  max f0; k   ag for
any capital that exceeds their own wealth, they pay (1  &)  r  max f0; k   ag where
& 2 [0; 1] is the subsidy rate. As before the subsidy is nanced out of taxation.
We nd that subsidies to borrowing by entrepreneurs can have a substantial impact on
aggregate outcomes. GDP increases by up to a factor of 2 see Figure 7. On the other
hand, this does not result in a commensurate increase in welfare: welfare rises by under 20%.
This is because the benets of this policy accrue only to a small set of agents, specically
entrepreneurs, who are already wealthy and have a low marginal utility of consumption. The
share of entrepreneurs rises somewhat but by less than a subsidy to education of 100%, be-
cause a subsidy to entrepreneurs does not help non-entrepreneurs to accumulate the wealth
that would allow them to become entrepreneurs were they to have the opportunity. The
capital-output ratio increases dramatically with such a subsidy but so does the Gini coef-
cient of wealth. Subsidies to education increase welfare for a large set of the agents, as
seen in the comparability between the impact of education subsidies on welfare and on out-
put. By contrast, although a subsidy to entrepreneurs dramatically increases output, its
impact on welfare is an order of magnitude smaller because most of the benets accrue to a
small number of agents (entrepreneurs, who are under 10% of the agents), who were already
disproportionately wealthy (so their marginal utility of consumption is low). Thus, in the
class of models where nancing constraints on entrepreneurs are important for matching the
wealth distribution, subsidies to entrepreneurs seem to generate welfare benets that are
inequitable, whereas subsidies and grants to education generate welfare benets that are
equitable.
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Figure 7 Subsidies to entrepreneurs in the model economy.
6 Conclusion
We study the interaction of credit constraints on education and on entrepreneurship. En-
trepreneurs are disproportionately college-educated, and college-educated entrepreneurs are
more protable. We nd in our model that, even though education and entrepreneurship
rates are highly sensitive to the di¤erential returns to entrepreneurship across educational
groups, these ndings are because the college educated are wealthier, not because they are
intrinsically better entrepreneurs, consistent with the European survey data. Thus, educa-
tion benets entrepreneurship indirectly, by raising the earnings and wealth available for
would-be entrepreneurs. This is an important nding that is worthy of corroboration using
disaggregated data in the future.
Interestingly, the aggregate impact of education policy that subsidizes education through
redistribution is larger than the impact of removing the nancing constraints on education.
The reason is that, by generating more high-earning college graduates, education policy has
a powerful e¤ect on physical capital accumulation in the economy, making capital cheaper
and more available and loosening the credit constraints experienced by entrepreneurs, as
well as ensuring this capital is accumulated by a large number of agents. This is consistent
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with our survey results, where in European countries with more support for tertiary edu-
cation entrepreneurs report lighter credit constraints and higher protability. Thus, taking
the constraints on entrepreneurs as given, subsidizing education turns out to be a way to
substantially raise welfare and GDP in the long-run. Financing education also seems to be
more e¤ective in raising welfare for a broad set of agents than subsidizing entrepreneurs.
It would be interesting to see whether this conclusion is robust to di¤erent approaches to
modeling education and self employment, but this paper sets a benchmark in the context of
a modeling framework that is known to deliver a strong match to the wealth distribution.
In what is already a complicated economic environment, we abstract from some important
factors that might a¤ect both entrepreneurship and education, such as learning. In many
models of entrepreneurship, starting from Jovanovic (1982), entrepreneurs learn about their
types. Such an environment would require new dimensions of heterogeneity but would allow
for richer and more complex dynamics, and could endogenize exit. Similarly, it may be that
agents do not know their suitability for college, di¤ering in some sort of ability distinct from
labor productivity y, and they learn this in college. Finally a model in which agents overlap
with their parents so that there is inter-vivo giving would be interesting too. Such a model
would likely require both parents and children to care about each other, again signicantly
raising the level of complexity in the model. We also abstract from the eld of study of
the educated: while our presentations of this work suggested that there is a common belief
that entrepreneurship is more common in certain elds or professions, Lazear (2005) nds
that entrepreneurs tend to be generalists, suggesting that a students college major may not
be a rst order determinant of their future entrepreneurial decisions. This remains an open
question.
Also our model of college is simple. There exists a technology whereby agents may
increase their human capital at a cost. An extension that includes a more detailed model
of the market for college would be interesting to the extent that the cost of college might
in turn respond to the policy considerations raised in this paper. Such a model would be
suitable for studying the causes of the recent rise in the cost of college in the US, and is left
for future work.
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A Simulation Method
The algorithm is the following:
1. Choose a grid A of possible values of wealth.
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2. Choose an initial guess for the wage, tax and value functions.30
3. Solve c, a0, and k to maximize households problems given interest rate, wage, tax and
future values given by the guesses of the value functions and the incentive compatibility
constraints.
4. Iterate on step 3 using the new guesses for the value functions until the value func-
tions converge. Blackwells Theorem indicates this should occur in nite time for any
arbitrary degree of desired precision.
5. Compute measures with grid A, setting capital demand in the non-entrepreneurial
sector to equal wealth minus capital demand in the entrepreneurial sector. This allows
us to compute total labor demand and supply. We use the di¤erence to update the
wage guess depending on whether or not labor supply is greater than demand.
6. Go back to step 3 with new wage guess. Iterate until labor market clears.
7. Compute government budget and update tax rate guess depending on whether tax
receipts are greater or less than zero. Return to step 2 until government budget is in
balance.
B Calibration details
To estimate hazard rates out of entrepreneurship we proceed as follows. First, Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006) nd an exit rate among entrepreneurs of 0:206 in PSID.31 Bates (1990)
reports a logit regression of the entrepreneurs survival that carries a coe¢ cient of 0:2522
on earning a college degree, a coe¢ cient of 0:1082 on earning a high school degree, and a
coe¢ cient of  1:3112 on not having completed high school (the reference group in their
sample). The survival odds for a college earner are e 1:3112+0:2522+x where x carries the
inuence of other factors. For a high school earner, it is e 1:3112+0:1082+x. This trans-
lates into probability di¤erences of e 1:3112+0:2522+x=(1 + e 1:3112+0:2522+x) for college and
e 1:3112+0:1082+x=(1 + e 1:3112+0:1082+x) for high school.
30The interest rate is determined by the wage, using the optimality conditions for the non-entrepreneurial
sector.
31This is consistent with our results from the 2005 Factors of Business Success survey, where 81% of
entrepreneurs report that their plan for the future is to continue with the enterprise.
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The di¤erence between these two obviously depends on x. The average survival rate
according to the PSID is 1  0:206 = 0:794. If c is the survival probability for college and n
is the survival rate for non-college then to preserve this average we require
c 0:41 + n 0:59 = 0:794
Plugging in, we get that
e 1:3112+0:2522+x=(1+e 1:3112+0:2522+x)0:41+e 1:3112+0:1082+x=(1+e 1:3112+0:1082+x)0:59 = 0:794
which implies that x = 2:4945. Consequently the survival probability for college is 0:8077
and for non-college is 0:7843.
Thus the calibrated tensor F x is the following:
"
0:954 0:2157
0:046 0:7843
#
for non-college educated,
and
"
0:954 0:1923
0:046 0:8077
#
for college educated. Thus, in terms of the parameters in the text, the
ow into potential entrepreneurship for the non-college educated in = 0:046, the frequency
of entrepreneurial opportunities for the educated relative to the uneducated in = 1, the
probability of losing an entrepreneurial opportunity for the non-educated is out = 0:2157
and the relative exit rate for the educated compared to the uneducated isout = 0:8915.
51
